Until today, there could be some debate about the applicability of Twombly to non-antitrust cases. No longer. Not after today's Supreme Court decision in Ashcroft v Iqbal, No. 07-1015 (U.S. May 18, 2009).
The decision is here: Download 07-1015
The case involved a Bivens action against former Attorney General Ashcroft, and others, by a Pakistani national alleging that he was detained and held under restrictive conditions on the basis of his race, religion, or national origin.
As discussed at SCOTUS blog, here , the Supreme Court held that high officials like Ashcroft cannot be held liable for misconduct of actors down the ranks, but only for their only misconduct. The decision thus obviously taps into the ongoing debate about culpability for the torture of terrorism suspects.
But, more significantly, for antitrust practitioners, the decision was made on pleading grounds, applying Twombly. Here, the decision breaks new ground in a couple of ways:
First, the Supreme Court expressly lays out the role for "judicial experience and common sense" in conducting the plausibility analysis:
"Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."
It is ironic that this expansion of judicial discretion is being championed by the conservative wing of the Court.
Second, the Court identified some statements it found "conclusory," including that:
Mueller was "instrumental" in adopting and executing the policy. (See Slip Op at 16-17)
As the dissent argues, it is not at all clear that these allegations should be disregarded as "conclusory." They do plead conclusions, but to a degree, all factual allegations do.
The lasting legacy of the decision, from a pleading perspective, will undoubtedly be an ever increasing debate over what distinguishes a cognizable factual allegation from a "conclusory" one. That line has not yet been satisfactorily drawn.